Q1/2019 - UN-Menschenrechtsausschuss (UNHCR)

40. Tagung, Genf, 25. Februar - 22. März 2019

 

Report on Privacy in the Digital Age

Der 40. Tagung des UN-Menschenrechtsausschusses lag ein weiterer Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters zum Datenschutz im digitalen Zeitalter, Joseph Cannataci vor. In diesem Bericht werden vor allem die Themen Sicherheit und Überwachung sowie Gender und Datenschutz im Gesundheitswesen behandelt.

In dem Kapitel zu „Sicherheit und Überwachung“ fordert der Sonderberichterstatter die UN-Staaten auf, der renovierten Europaratskonvention zum Datenschutz vom 18. Mai 2018 (Convention 108+) beizutreten. Die Konvention hätte die Prinzipien „Proportionalität“ und „Notwendigkeit“ mit Blick auf legitime Einschränkungen des Schutzes der Privatsphäre im Interesse nationaler Sicherheit oder öffentlicher Ordnung präziser gefasst. Gerade bei neuen Gesetzen zur Strafverfolgung im Internet würde diesen beiden Prinzipien oft nicht ausreichend Rechnung getragen. Das betrifft insbesondere Massenüberwachungen im Netz. Notwendig sei die Stärkung von unabhängigen Aufsichtsbehörden, auch für die Geheimdienste. Das gelte ebenfalls für den grenzüberschreitenden Austausch von Informationen und personenbezogenen Daten zwischen Strafverfolgungsbehörden und Geheimdiensten, vor allem zwischen Staaten mit einem unterschiedlichen Rechtsstaatsniveau[1].

Der Sonderberichterstatter widmet sich ausführlich dem Thema „Gender und Datenschutz im Gesundheitswesen“. In seinen Schlussfolgerungen fordert er verstärkte Schutzmaßnahmen, die insbesondere auch neue Online-Verwundbarkeiten und Diskriminierungen berücksichtigen. Notwendig sei vor allem größtmögliche Transparenz[2]. Er gibt insgesamt sieben Empfehlungen an die Vereinten Nationen, die UN-Mitgliedsstaaten und private Unternehmen[3].

Report on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism

Ein weiterer Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters zum Kampf gegen Terrorismus beschäftigte sich mit den möglichen und legitimierten Einschränkungen von Menschenrechten im Kampf gegen Terrorismus und Extremismus. In dem Bericht werden die Staaten aufgefordert sicherzustellen, dass Maßnahmen zum Schutz der nationalen Sicherheit nicht zur Aushöhlung grundlegender Menschenrechte und zur Einschränkung von Aktivitäten der Zivilgesellschaft – online wie offline – führen dürften. Terrorismus oder Extremismus dürfe nicht breit und vage, sondern müsse eng und präzise definiert werden. Der Kampf gegen Terrorismus und Extremismus dürfe nicht zur Einschränkung von friedlichen Protesten führen. Notstandsmaßnahmen sollten zeitlich begrenzt sein und dürften nicht missbraucht werden, um gegen legitime Aktionen der Zivilgesellschaft vorzugehen. Friedliche Formen des Widerspruchs seien der Kern der Meinungsäußerungsfreiheit[4].

Mehr zum Thema
Q1/2019UN
  1. [1] Report oft he Special Rapporteur on Privacy in the Digital Age, Dokument A/HRC/40/63, Genf, 27. Februar 2019; „Recommendations: 47.The incorporation by UN Member States into their domestic legal system of the standards and safeguards set out in Convention 108+ Article 11, for the protection of the fundamental right to privacy, especially: (a) the creation of legal certainty by ensuring that any and all privacy-intrusive measures, even for the purposes of national security, defence and public safety as well as the prevention, investigation and prosecution of crime are provided for by laws which are the subject of proper public consultation and parliamentary scrutiny; (b) the establishment of the test of “a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society” as the key metric which internal compliance units within intelligence and law enforcement agencies need to apply to any privacy-intrusive measure and against which the actions of such agencies will be measured and held accountable by independent oversight authorities and courts within the competent jurisdiction; (c) the establishment of one or more independent oversight authorities empowered by law and adequately resourced by the State in order to carry out effective review of any privacy-intrusive activities carried out by intelligence services and law-enforcement agencies. 48. The adoption of the principle “If it’s exchangeable, then it’s oversightable” in relation to any personal information exchanged between intelligence services and law enforcement agencies within a country, and across borders; (a) All UN Member States should amend their laws to empower their independent authorities entrusted with oversight of intelligence activities, to specifically and explicitly, oversight of all personal information exchanged between the intelligence agencies of the countries for which they are responsible. (b) Whenever possible and appropriate, the independent oversight authorities of both the transmitting and the receiving States should have immediate and automated access to the personal data ex changed between the intelligence services and/or law enforcement agencies of their respective States; (c) All UN Member States should amend their legislation to specifically empower their national and state Intelligence Oversight Authorities to have the legal authority to share information, consult and discuss best oversight practices with the Oversight Authorities of those States to which personal data has been transmitted or otherwise exchanged by the intelligence agencies of their respective States; (d) When an intelligence agency transmits intelligence analysis containing personal information or other forms of personal data received from another State to a third State or group of States, this latter exchange should be subject to those States’ intelligence oversight authorities. 49. The competent authorities in Member States when contemplating the use of bulk powers for surveillance, should first examine, then prioritise and adopt to the greatest possible extent, the measures for introducing the good practices that are recommended in the compendium of Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, November 2018 in addition to applying the criteria for deployment and safeguards adopted by the ECtHR in Big Brother Watch et al. of September 2018. Siehe: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session40/Pages/ListReports.aspx
  2. [2] Report oft he Special Rapporteur on Privacy in the Digital Age, Dokument A/HRC/40/63, Genf, 27. Februar 2019; „Conclusions: 101.The Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls on “every individual and every organ of society” to promote and respect human rights. States, companies, religious bodies, civil society, professional organisations and individuals all have important roles to play. 102. The confidence of individuals to share ideas and to assemble is also fundamental to the health of societies and democracy. The loss of privacy can lead to a loss of this confidence including confidence in Government and institutions established to represent the public interests, withdrawal from participation, which can adversely impact and undermine representative democracies. 103. While privacy rights are not costless, or free of risks to governments, the challenges are outweighed by our collective interest in democracy. The right to privacy for women, as well as children and individuals of diverse sexual orientations, gender identities, gender expressions and sex characteristics, is critically important for all of the reasons outlined above and reported in submissions. 104. Gender based breaches of privacy are a systemic form of denial of human rights; discriminatory in nature and frequently perpetuating unequal social, economic, cultural and political structures. 105. Addressing gender based incursions into privacy requires frameworks at international, regional and domestic levels. 106. States, in preventing gender based privacy invasions, need to actively protect privacy in policy development, legislative reform, service provision, regulatory action, support to civil society organizations, and educational and employment frameworks, and using the experiences of females, males, transgender women and men, and intersex people, and others who identify as outside the gender binary and cis-normativity. 107. The protection of personal information online should be a priority with the adoption of provisions equivalent or superior to the GDPR, for countries that are not party to the Regulation. Gender should be a key consideration for the development and enforcement of privacy protection frameworks. 108. Transparency is needed in how private companies use personal data of users, and respond to reports of online harassment. Greater gender diversity among those shaping online experiences is important for making products and platforms safer, more socially-responsible and accountable. Siehe: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session40/Pages/ListReports.aspx
  3. [3] Report oft he Special Rapporteur on Privacy in the Digital Age, Dokument A/HRC/40/63, Genf, 27. Februar 2019; „Summarised recommendations: Para: 109. United Nations bodies: All relevant special procedures and other mechanisms of the Human Rights Council and human rights treaty bodies should integrate gender and privacy into the implementation of their respective mandates. Para. 110. Member States: (a) Adopt an intersectional approach that recognises the specific benefits, experiences and threats to the right to privacy according to gender, and overarching privacy and human rights principles. (b) Undertake an assessment of their legal frameworks for prevention and punishment of privacy breaches based on gender, against relevant laws and treaties at global, regional and national levels. (c) Adopt policies, legal and regulatory frameworks providing comprehensive protection for the use and development of secure digital communications. (d) Promote meaningful internet access and bridge any digital gender divide. (e) Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to prevent, investigate and punish breaches of privacy perpetrated on the basis of the gender, sexual orientation or gender identity. Para. 111: Corporations: Implement the ‘UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ and avoid infringing on the human rights of all persons affected by their practices, with effective consideration of the gender-specific impact of their activities.“ Siehe: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session40/Pages/ListReports.aspx
  4. [4] Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism on the role of measures to address terrorism and violent extremism on closing civic space and violating the rights of civil society actors and human rights defenders, Genf, 28. Februar 2019, „Paragraph 74: States must ensure that their measures to address the threats of terrorism, violent extremism and protect national security do not negatively impact on civil society. In particular: (a) Definitions of terrorism and of violent extremism in national laws must not be overly broad and vague. They must be precise and sufficiently tight to not include members of civil society, or non-violent acts carried out in the exercise of fundamental freedoms. Emergency measures must be strictly limited and not used to crackdown on civil society actors. (b) Legitimate expression of opinions or thought must never be criminalised. Non-violent forms of dissent are at the core of freedom of expression. Reporting on, documenting or publishing information about terrorist acts or counter-terrorism measures, as are an essential aspect of transparency and accountability. The key role of the Internet, particularly within repressive societies or for marginalised groups, must be recognised and protected.“ Siehe: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session40/Pages/ListReports.aspx